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CHARLES DE SAILLAN*

United States Supreme Court Rules
EPA Must Take Action on Greenhouse
Gas Emissions: Massachusetts v. EPA
ABSTRACT
On April 2, 2007, the United States Supreme Court announced its
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, holding that the U.S.
EnvironmentalProtectionAgency (EPA) had improperly denied a
rulemaking petition requesting that the agency place limits on air
emissions that contribute to global warming. The petitionershad
asked EPA to regulate the emissions of certain greenhouse gases
from new motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act. In ruling on the
EPA's denial of the petition, the Supreme Court addressed three
issues. First, the Court held that the lead petitioner, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,had standing to sue for redress
of injuries caused by global warming. The Court also ruled that a
state acting to protect its quasi-sovereigninterests was entitled to
"special solicitude" in standing analysis. Second, the Court held
that the EPA had the statutory authority to regulate greenhouse
gases under the Clean Air Act. Finally, the Courtheld that the EPA
had not adequatelyjustified its denial of the petition in accordance
with the statute. The decision sets significantprecedentfor pending
andfuture litigation on global warming issues.
"A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with
a significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two trends are related."' So
states U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the Court
in Commonwealth ofMassachusettsv. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency, decided
on April 2, 2007. In what is likely to be a very important decision on the
control of greenhouse gas emissions, the Court held by a 5-to-4 vote that the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to regulate
greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act and that the EPA's justification
for not doing so was inadequate as a matter of law.

*

Charles de Saillan is Assistant General Counsel in the New Mexico Environment

Department, where he handles matters involving air quality, surface water and groundwater
quality, hazardous wastes, and site remediation. The views expressed in this article are his
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1. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Petition
This case began in October 1999 when 19 environmental, public
interest, and trade organizations, as diverse as the International Center for
Technology Assessment, Greenpeace USA, Public Citizen, and the New
Mexico Solar Energy Association 2 filed a rulemaking petition with the EPA
under the Clean Air Act.3 The petition also asserted a claim under section
553(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires each federal
agency to "give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule."4 The petitioners asked the EPA to issue a
rule regulating "greenhouse gas emissions," namely carbon dioxide (CO2),
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N 20), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), from
new motor vehicles under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act.'
Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, which is the statutory basis
of the petition, provides in relevant part:
The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and
from time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of
this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or
new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.6
The petitioners placed particular emphasis on two key terms in section
202(a)(1)-"air pollutant" and "welfare"-both of which are broadly
defined in the Clean Air Act. Section 302(g) of the Act defines "air
pollutant" as follows:

2. The 19 original petitioners were Alliance for Sustainable Communities; Applied Power
Technologies, Inc.; Bio Fuels America; The California Solar Energy Industries Assn.; Clements
Environmental Corp.; Environmental Advocates; Environmental and Energy Study Institute;
Friends of the Earth; Full Circle Energy Project, Inc.; The Green Party of Rhode Island;
Greenpeace USA; International Center for Technology Assessment; Network for
Environmental and Economic Responsibility of the United Church of Christ; New Jersey
Environmental Watch; New Mexico Solar Energy Assn.; Oregon Environmental Council;
Public Citizen; Solar Energy Industries Assn.; and The SUN DAY Campaign. Id. at 1449 n.15.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2000). The petitioners also cited the First Amendment of the
Constitution, which guarantees the right of the people "to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. Petition for Rulemaking and Collateral Relief Seeking Regulation of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from New Motor Vehicles under § 202 of the Clean Air Act, Int'l Ctr. for Tech.
Assessment v. Browner, EPA Docket No. A-2000-04 (Oct. 20, 1999) (on file with Natural
Resources Journal).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
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The term "air pollutant" means any air pollution agent or
combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical,
biological, radioactive (including source material, special
nuclear material, and byproduct material) substance or matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.
Such term includes any precursors to the formation of any air
pollutant, to the extent the [EPA] Administrator has identified
such precursor or precursors for the particular purpose for
which the term "air pollutant" is used.7
Notably, the term "welfare" includes such things as "weather" and
"climate." Section 302(h) of the Act defines the term "welfare" as follows:
All language referring to effects on welfare includes, but is
not limited to, effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation,
manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and
climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and
hazards to transportation, as well as effects on economic
values and on personal comfort and well-being, whether
caused by transformation, conversion, or combination with
other pollutants.8
Citing these provisions of the Clean Air Act, the petitioners maintained that
greenhouse gases are "air pollutants" under the Act,9 and that the emission
of greenhouse gases will endanger the public health and the public
welfare. ° Therefore, according to the petitioners, the EPA has a mandatory
duty to issue regulations under section 202(a)(1) prescribing standards for
the emission of greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles."
The petitioners noted that two previous EPA General Counsels had
concluded that the agency had the authority to regulate carbon dioxide
under the Clean Air Act.1 2 In a 1998 memorandum to the Administrator,
EPA General Counsel Jonathan Z. Cannon concluded that "CO 2 emissions
are within the scope of EPA's authority to regulate." 3 The following year,

7. Id. § 7602(g).
8. Id. § 7602(h).
9. Petition for Rulemaking and Collateral Relief Seeking Regulation of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from New Motor Vehicles under § 202 of the Clean Air Act, supra note 5, at 10-14.
10. Id. at 14-28.
11. Id. at 33-34.
12. Id. at 11-12.
13. Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, EPA General Counsel, to Carol M. Browner,
EPA Administrator, on EPA's Authority to Regulate Pollutants Emitted by Electric Power
Generation Sources 5 (Apr. 10, 1998) (on file with Natural Resources Journal).
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EPA General Counsel Gary S. Guzy reiterated this view in congressional
testimony. 4
On January 23, 2001, more than a year after the petition was filed,
the EPA published a notice in the Federal Register requesting public
comment on the petition.'5 During the 120-day comment period, which
ended May 23,2001, the EPA received nearly 50,000 public comments, most
of them supporting the petition. 6
B. EPA Denial of the Petition
On September 8, 2003, nearly four years after the petition had been
filed, the EPA denied the petition and published its denial in the Federal
Register.'7 The EPA gave several legal and policy reasons for denying the
petition.
The first reason was EPA's conclusion that it did not have the legal
authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. In support
of this conclusion, the EPA recited an assortment of "indicia of
congressional intent" suggesting that Congress had yet to decide whether
regulation of greenhouse gases was warranted. 8 The EPA noted that
several bills were introduced in Congress that would have mandated such
regulation, but none became law. Moreover, while Congress had enacted
several pieces of legislation that specifically address global warming, none
of that legislation authorized a regulatory program. 9 The EPA also cited the
Supreme Court decision in Food & Drug Administration v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp.,2' holding that the Food and Drug Administration
did not have the statutory authority to regulate tobacco. That decision,
according to the EPA, "cautions agencies against using broadly worded
statutory authority to regulate in areas raising unusually significant
economic and political issues when Congress has specifically addressed
those areas in other statutes."' Having thus concluded that the Clean Air
Act does not authorize regulation to address concerns about global climate
change, the EPA went on to assert, in circular fashion, that "[i ] t follows from

14. Is CO 2 a Pollutantand Does EPA Have the Power to Regulate It?: 1. Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on National Economic Growth,NaturalResources, and RegulatoryAffairs of the H. Comm.
on Government Reform and the Subcomm. on Energy and Environment of the H. Comm. on Science,
106th Cong., at 11-19 (Oct. 6, 1999) (statement of EPA Gen. Counsel Gary S. Guzy).
15. Notices Environmental Protection Agency, 66 Fed. Reg. 7486 (Jan. 23, 2001).
16. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922,
52,924 (Sept. 8, 2003).
17. Id. at 52,922.
18. Id. at 52,926.
19. Id. at 52,925-28.
20. 529 U.S. 120, 120 (2000).
21. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,925.
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this conclusion, that [greenhouse gases], as such, are not air pollutants
under the [Clean Air Act's] regulatory provisions."' 2
In concluding that it lacked legal authority to regulate greenhouse
gases, the EPA also relied on a new legal opinion from its General Counsel.
On August 28, 2003, EPA General Counsel Robert E. Fabricant issued a
memorandum concluding, contrary to his predecessors, that the Clean Air
Act "does not authorize EPA to regulate for global climate change
purposes. " 23 The General Counsel's memorandum set forth several reasons
for its conclusion, all of which were repeated by the EPA in denying the
petition. 24 General Counsel Fabricant expressly repudiated the conclusion
of his predecessors, stating that the memorandum " formally withdraws Mr.
Cannon's April 10,1998 memorandum as no longer representing the views
of EPA's General Counsel."'
The EPA's second reason for denying the petition was exercise of
the agency's discretion under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act.
According to the EPA, section 202(a) (1) "does not impose a mandatory duty
on the Administrator to exercise her judgment"; rather, it "provides the
Administrator with discretionary authority."26 The EPA noted that the
provision "does not require the Administrator to act by a specified
deadline."27 Further, the provision "conditions authority to act on a
discretionary exercise of the Administrator's judgment regarding whether
motor vehicle emissions cause or contribute to air pollution that may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. " 2'
The EPA's third reason for denying the petition was that regulation
of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles would interfere with the fuel
efficiency standards set by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT).
The EPA asserted that "the only practical way to reduce tailpipe emissions
of CO 2 is to improve fuel economy."2 9 It pointed out that "Congress has
already created a detailed set of mandatory standards governing the fuel
economy of cars and light duty trucks, and has authorized DOT-not

22. Id. at 52,928. EPA repeated, "Because EPA lacks [Clean Air Act] regulatory authority
to address global climate change, the term 'air pollutant' as used in the regulatory provisions
cannot be interpreted to encompass global climate change." Id.
23. Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, EPA General Counsel, to Marianne L.
Horinko, EPA Acting Administrator, on EPA's Authority to Impose Mandatory Controls to
Address Global Climate Change Under the Clean Air Act 1 (Aug. 28,2003).
24. See id. at 3-11.
25. Id. at 1 (citation omitted). General Counsel Fabricant further stated, "The Cannon
memorandum and the statements by Mr. Guzy concerning this matter no longer represent the
views of EPA's General Counsel." Id. at 12.
26. 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,929.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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EPA - to implement those standards."' The EPA concluded that its options
were limited to setting more stringent fuel economy standards, which
would abrogate the DOT standards, or setting less stringent standards,
which would be meaningless.31
The EPA's final reason for denial of the petition was a policy
reason, that it would be neither "effective [nior appropriate" for the EPA to
establish greenhouse gas standards for motor vehicles "at this time." 32 The
EPA emphasized the uncertainty in the science of climate change: "The
science of climate change is extraordinarily complex and still evolving," and
"there continue to be uncertainties in our understanding of the factors that
may effect future climate change and how it should be addressed."33
Further, according to the EPA, "the President has laid out a comprehensive
approach to climate change."3 The approach "calls for near-term voluntary
actions and incentives along with programs aimed at reducing scientific
uncertainties and encouraging technological development so that
government may effectively and efficiently address the climate change issue
over the long term."3' The EPA asserted that to establish greenhouse gas
"emission standards for U.S. motor vehicles at this time would require the
EPA to make scientific and technical judgments without the benefit of the
studies being developed to reduce uncertainties and advance
technologies." 36 The EPA also asserted that establishing such standards
"would.. .result in an inefficient, piecemeal approach to addressing the
climate change issue."37 The EPA further argued that such regulation "could
also weaken U.S. efforts to persuade key developing countries to reduce the
[greenhouse gas] intensity of their economies."' For these reasons, the EPA
concluded that it "would decline the petitioners' request to regulate motor
vehicle [greenhouse gas] emissions even if it had authority to promulgate
such regulations."39

30. Id.
31. Id. Somewhat contrary to EPA's assertions, the petition listed other practical methods
of reducing carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles that could be implemented
independent of fuel economy standards, such as the increased use of hybrid vehicles and
electric vehicles and the introduction of hydrogen-powered fuel cell vehicles. See Petition for
Rulemaking and Collateral Relief Seeking Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New
Motor Vehicles under § 202 of the Clean Air Act, supra note 5, at 29-33.
32. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,930.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 52,931.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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C. The D.C. Circuit Decision Affirming EPA
Following the EPA's denial of the petition, the petitioners appealed
that action to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
under section 307(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act. That provision allows judicial
review in the District of Columbia Circuit of any "final action of the
Administrator.. .if such action is based on a determination of nationwide
scope or effect."4 ° Twelve states (including New Mexico), one territory, and
three municipalities joined the petitioners as interveners.41 Ten states and
several trade associations intervened on behalf of the EPA defending the
denial.42
On July 15, 2005, the court of appeals issued its decision, affirming
the EPA's denial of the petition. 43 The court of appeals' 2-to-1 decision was
oddly fractured, with three separate opinions, including a dissent. Writing
for the court, Judge A. Raymond Randolph based the decision on agency
discretion. He noted that "a reviewing court will uphold agency
conclusions based on policy judgments when an agency must resolve issues
on the frontiers of scientific knowledge." 44 Thus, the court held "that the
EPA Administrator had properly exercised his discretion under § 202(a)(1)
in denying the petition for rulemaking." 41 Judge David B. Sentelle wrote a
separate opinion that concurred in the judgment but dissented in part. He
opined that the petitioners lacked standing to sue in that they had not
suffered a particularized injury in fact. 6 Judge David S. Tatel dissented. In
his view, at least one of the interveners, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, had established standing to sue .47 He further stated his view

40. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000).
41. The interveners supporting the original petitioners in seeking to overturn EPA's denial
of the petition were the states of California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, (the Commonwealth
of) Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Washington; the territory of American Samoa; the municipalities of Baltimore, the District of
Columbia, and New York City; and the environmental organizations Center for Biological
Diversity, Center for Food Safety, Conservation Law Foundation of New England,
Environmental Defense, National Environmental Trust, Natural Resources Defense Council,
Sierra Club, Union of Concerned Scientists, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group.
42. The interveners supporting EPA in defending its denial of the petition were the states
of Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, and
Utah; and the trade organizations Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, National
Automobile Dealers Association, Engine Manufacturers Association, Truck Manufacturers
Association, C02 Litigation Group, and Utility Air Regulatory Group.
43. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 147 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
44. Id. at 58 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62,82
(D.C. Cir. 1978)).

45.

Id.

46.
47.

Id. at 59-60 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 64-67 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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that the EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 48 and
that the EPA's reasons for not exercising this authority did not follow the
statutory standard.49
After the court of appeals denied a motion for rehearing en banc,s°
the petitioners, led by Massachusetts, sought review in the U.S. Supreme
Court. The Court granted their petition for certiorari on June 26,2006..5 The
Court heard oral argument on the case on November 29, 2006.

II. SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court issued its decision in Massachusettsv. EPA on
April 2, 2007. It reversed the court of appeals and ruled that the EPA had
improperly denied the rulemaking petition. The Court's opinion was
authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion on the
standing issue that was joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Justice
Scalia filed a separate dissenting opinion on the merits that was joined by
the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Alito. The Court addressed three
issues in its decision.
A. Standing
The first issue that the Court addressed was whether the petitioners
had standing to sue. As the Court explained, the basis of the standing
requirement is Article III of the Constitution, which limits federal-court
jurisdiction to "Cases" and "Controversies." 2 The jurisdiction of the federal
courts is limited "to questions presented in an adversary context and in a
form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial
process." 3 To establish standing, a litigant must demonstrate "that it has
suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or
imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it is
likely that a favorable decision will redress the injury."' In other words, the
litigant must show injury, causation, and redressability.

48. Id. at 67-73 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 73-82.
50. Massachusetts v. EPA, 433 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (Tatel, J., dissenting).
51. Massachusetts v. EPA, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (2006) (mem.).
52. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438,1452 (2007). Article m of the U.S. Constitution
provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to" enumerated "Cases" and "Controversies."
U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl.
1.
53. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1452 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,95 (1968)).
54. Id. at 1453 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
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The Court noted that "[o]nly one of the petitioners needs to have
standing" for the Court to consider the petition. 5 Focusing on the lead
petitioner, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Court concluded that
the Commonwealth met the standing requirements. Interestingly, the Court
ruled that a state, acting as parens patriae and protecting its quasi-sovereign
interests, "is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis."56 In57
support of its ruling, the Court referenced Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
in which Justice Holmes wrote,
"This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of
quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the
earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to
whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its
inhabitants shall breathe pure air."58
The Court concluded that, "[j ] ust as Georgia's 'independent interest.. .in all
the earth and air within its domain' supported federal jurisdiction a century
ago, so too does Massachusetts' well-founded desire to preserve its
sovereign territory today."59
The Court went on to find that Massachusetts had suffered injury
due to global warming. Because global warming had caused sea levels to
rise, Massachusetts had lost some of its coastal land, an injury that is
expected to worsen over the course of the next century. 6' Moreover, the
Commonwealth "owns a substantial portion of the state's coastal
property. " 61 The Court found that the costs of remediation of damage
resulting from inundation, storm surges, and floods "could run well into
the hundreds of millions of dollars."62
The Court next found that greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles cause or contribute to the Commonwealth's injury. The
Court was not persuaded by the EPA's argument that emissions from new
motor vehicles contribute "so insignificantly" to the injuries that they do not
meet the causation requirement for standing.' The Court noted that the
transportation sector of the United States "emits an enormous quantity of

55. Id. at 1453-54 (citing Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Inst'l Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2
(2006)).
56. Id. at 1454-55.
57. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
58. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438,1454 (2007) (quoting Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. 230,
237) (emphasis by Justice Holmes).
59. Id. (alteration in original).
60. Id. at 1455-56.
61. Id. at 1456.
62. Id.
63. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1457 (2007).
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carbon dioxide into the atmosphere..., more than 1.7 billion metric tons in
1999 alone," according to one expert. 6' Further, considering only carbon
dioxide emissions from the transportation sector, "the United States would
still rank as the third-largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world,
outpaced only by the European Union and China." 65 The Court thus
concluded that emissions from motor vehicles in the United States "make
a meaningful contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations and hence.. .to
global warming."'
Next, the Court found that Massachusetts' injury is redressable and
that the remedy is regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles.67 While the Court recognized that the remedy would not by itself
reverse global warming, it nevertheless found that the remedy would slow
or reduce global warming.' The remedy would relieve a "discrete injury"
to the Commonwealth, which is sufficient to support standing, even if it
would not relieve every injury.69 The Court also recognized that a delay in
emission reductions would be unavoidable, as regulations are implemented
and new regulated vehicles eventually replace older unregulated ones. Yet
the Court found that, "[b]ecause of the enormity of the potential
consequences associated with man-made climate change," the relatively
short delay "is essentially irrelevant. " "'
Dissenting from the Court's decision, Chief Justice Roberts, joined
by three other Justices, would have found that Massachusetts lacked
standing. Chief Justice Roberts began by criticizing the "special solicitude"
the Court gave to Massachusetts: "Relaxing Article III standing
requirements because asserted injuries are pressed by a State.. .has no basis
in our jurisprudence.... "7 Chief Justice Roberts went on to criticize the
Court's finding that Massachusetts has standing. To establish standing, he
stated, the petitioners must allege an injury that is "'concrete and
particularized,'" and that affects them in a "'personal and individual
way.' "' Yet, " [tihe very concept of global warming seems inconsistent with
this particularization requirement"73 because it is "'harmful to humanity at

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1458.
See id.
See id.
Id. (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 224 n.15 (1982)).
Id.
Id. at 1464 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1467 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 & n.1 (1992)).
Id.
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large.' 74 Furthermore, in his view, the petitioners' alleged injury is based
on a "conclusory statement" and "pure conjecture"; 7 the connection
between the alleged injury and the EPA's inaction "is far too speculative to
establish causation";76 and the likelihood that regulation of emissions from77
new motor vehicles will redress the alleged injury is "pure conjecture."
Chief Justice Roberts concluded that "the Court's self-professed relaxation
of [the] Article III requirements has caused us to transgress 'the
proper- and properly limited - role of the courts in a democratic society.'"'
B. EPA Authority
Having dispensed with the standing issue, the Court turned to the
merits of the case, beginning with the question of the EPA's authority under
the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gases. The Court had no trouble
concluding that the EPA had such authority. It dismissed the EPA's
assertions that Congress did not intend the agency to regulate greenhouse
gases, and therefore such gases do not fall within the Act's definition of "air
pollutant."79 Such a reading is foreclosed by the text of the statute, the Court
ruled, quoting the Clean Air Act's "sweeping definition of 'air pollutant"
in section 302(g).8" The Court derided the EPA's indicia of congressional
intent as "postenactment legislative history" having little bearing on
Congress's intent when it enacted section 202(a)(1).81 Nor was the Court
persuaded by the EPA's argument that regulation of global gas emissions
from new motor vehicles would interfere with the DOT fuel economy
standards. The EPA's mandate to protect health and the environment is
wholly independent of DOT's mandate to promote energy efficiency, and
there is no reason why the two agencies cannot implement the programs to
"avoid inconsistency." 82 The Court concluded that "[c]arbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are without a doubt"

74. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in judgment)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1469.
77. Id. at 1470.
78. Id. at 1471 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).
79. See id. at 1473.
80. Id. at 1460. The definition of "air pollutant" is set forth supra text accompanying note
7.
81. Id. at 1460. The Court referred to such post-enactment legislative history as "'not only
oxymoronic but inherently entitled to little weight.'" Id. at 1460 n.27 (quoting Cobell v. Norton,
428 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
82. Id. at 1462.
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substances covered by the Clean Air Act's "capacious definition of 'air
pollutant,"' and are subject to regulation under the Act.83
Justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion dissenting on the merits that
the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Alito joined. Justice Scalia took
issue with the Court's conclusion that greenhouse gases fall within the
definition of "air pollutant."' He observed that the term "air pollutant" as
defined in the Act is "'any air pollution agent or combination of such
agents, including any physical, chemical,...substance or matter which is
emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air."" Thus, an air pollutant
must be a "pollution agent." Justice Scalia then referred to the EPA's
discussion of its regulatory program under section 109 of the Act, 86 which
authorizes the EPA to set national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS)
for conventional air pollutants.87 In the notice denying the petition, the EPA
explained - as an aside - that the NAAQS program was not well-suited to
the regulation of carbon dioxide. The EPA stated that it used the NAAQS
"'to address air pollution problems that occur primarily at ground level,'"
but that carbon dioxide concentrations are fairly consistent "'up to
approximately the lower stratosphere. ' "' Justice Scalia quoted several
passages from this discussion. He then concluded from these passages that
the words "air pollution" naturally mean only that pollution occurring "'at
ground level or near the surface of the earth.'" 89 He asserted that the EPA's
"reasonable interpretation" was entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A.
v. NaturalResources Defense Council.'
C. EPA Discretion
Having concluded that the EPA has the authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions, the Court next considered whether the EPA had
properly exercised its discretion in declining to use that authority. The
Court began by acknowledging that the agency "has broad discretion to
choose how best to marshal its limited resources and personnel to carry out

83. Id. at 1460, 1462.
84. Id. at 1475-76.
85. Id. at 1475 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For the definition of "air pollutant," see supra text
accompanying note 7.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000).
87. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1477 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,926-27 (Sept. 8, 2003)).
88. Id. (quoting 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,926-27).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1476. In Chevron, the Court held that, if a provision of a statute is ambiguous, the
reasonable interpretation of the administrative agency entrusted to implement and enforce the
statute is entitled to deference. See 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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its delegated responsibilities."9 1 That discretion, however, is circumscribed
by statute. In responding to a petition for rulemaking, the agency's "reasons
for action or inaction must conform to the authorizing statute."92 To deny
the petition under section 202(a)(1), the Court held, the EPA must either
find that the pollutants do not cause or contribute to global warming or
provide some reasoned justification for not making a finding.93 The court
found that the EPA had failed to justify its decision not to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions in conformance with section 202(a)(1). Although
the EPA "offered a laundry list of reasons not to regulate," these reasons
"have nothing to do with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to
climate change," nor "do they amount to a reasoned justification for
declining to form a scientific judgment."94 The Court was unimpressed by
the EPA's description of the scientific uncertainty surrounding the global
warming issue as a reason not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.9" The
Court stated, "If the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes
the EPA from making a reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases
contribute to global warming, EPA must say so. "96 The Court concluded
that the "EPA has offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide
whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change," and its
action was therefore "'arbitrary, capricious .... or otherwise not in accordance with law. ' ' "7
Justice Scalia, dissenting on the merits, again took issue with the
Court's reasoning, criticizing it on two grounds. First, he argued that the
EPA had not made any determination whether greenhouse gases cause or
contribute to global warming; the EPA had simply deferred making such
a determination at this time. The statute does not require the EPA to make
a determination whenever a petition is filed, according to Justice Scalia."
Moreover, "the statute says nothing at all about the reasons for which the
Administrator may defer making a judgment- the permissible reasons for
deciding not to grapple with the issue at the present time."' The EPA, in his
view, had acted within its discretion in deferring a decision."° Second,
Justice Scalia argued that, contrary to the Court's holding, the EPA had

91. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1459 (majority opinion) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 842-45).

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 1462.
Id.
Id. at 1462-63.
See supranote 33 and accompanying text.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1463.
Id. at 1463 (quoting Clean Air Act § 307(d)(9)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A)).
Id. at 1472 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1473.
Id. at 1473-74.
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adequately justified its action. He recalled the Court's statement that "[i]f...
the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA from making
a reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global
warming, EPA must say so.""1 ' His retort to this statement was that the
"EPA has said precisely that." "2Justice Scalia then quoted at length from the
EPA's discussion of the scientific uncertainties surrounding global warming
in the notice denying the petition.' °3 He remarked that he did not know
what more the EPA could say to satisfy the majority.'0
III. COMMENTARY
In reaching its decision in Massachusettsv. EPA, the Supreme Court
had to grapple with some difficult issues. As suggested by the 5-to4 split,
the Court's decision was not inexorable. The toughest question was
standing, and the Court made some new law in deciding the question in
favor of Massachusetts. While the Court easily found that the EPA has the
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, the Court had to finely
parse the EPA's denial of the rulemaking petition in order to reach its
conclusion that the agency had not adequately explained its decision to
abstain from exercising its authority.
A. A New Theory of Standing for States
On the question of standing, the Court clearly broke new ground
in ruling that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, given its "stake in
protecting its quasi-sovereign interests,...is entitled to special solicitude in
our standing analysis." 1 5 In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts rebuked the
Court for "adopt[ing] a new theory of Article III standing for States....106
Indeed, the Court went back a full century to the Tennessee Copper case,
which long predates modem standing jurisprudence, to find precedent to
support its ruling. 1°7
Oddly, it is not entirely clear from the opinion how the Court
applied the "special solicitude" afforded Massachusetts in protecting its
quasi-sovereign interests. The Court seemed to analyze the standing

101. Id. at 1474 (quoting id. at 1463 (majority opinion)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1474-75 (quoting 68 Fed. Reg. 52,930 (Sept. 8, 2003)).
104. Id. at 1475.
105. Id. at 1454-55 (majority opinion).
106. Id. at 1466 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). See also id. at 1471 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (The
Court has "devise[d] a new doctrine of state standing to support its result.").
107. Id. at 1454 (majority opinion); see also id. at 1465 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The Court
has to go back a full century in an attempt to justify its novel standing rule[s]....").
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question based on the Commonwealth's ownership of coastal property
within its borders." 8 That certainly was how the dissenters viewed the
majority opinion. 1 9 And the dissenters point out that property ownership
is not a quasi-sovereign interest; it is a non-sovereign interest. 1" There are,
however, strong indications that the Court intended a broader analysis,
which included the Commonwealth's quasi-sovereign interests as well as
its property ownership interests. For example, the Court expressly
recognized "Massachusetts' well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign
territory.""' The Court also stated that the Commonwealth's ownership of
"a great deal of the territory alleged to be affected only reinforces the
conclusion that its stake in the outcome of this case is sufficiently concrete
to warrant the exercise of federal judicial power,"" 2 thus indicating that
land ownership was not the primary basis for standing. Further, the Court
stated that the "[p]etitioners maintain that the seas are rising and will
continue to rise, and have alleged that such a rise will lead to the loss of
Massachusetts' sovereign territory."" 3 Thus, the Court appears to have
intended the Commonwealth's quasi-sovereign interests to be part of its
standing analysis.
By recognizing an injury to the Commonwealth's quasi-sovereign
interests as a basis for standing, the Court did not need to find that the
petitioners suffered a "personal and individual" harm. The Court found it
to be "of considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a
sovereign State and not, as it was in Lujan [v. Defenders of Wildlife], a private
individual."" 4 In dissent, taking the opposite tack, the Chief Justice wrote
that the petitioners must be "affected in a 'personal and individual way,'""'
and that they must "seek relief that 'directly and tangibly benefits [them]'
in a manner distinct from its impacts on 'the public at large.' 16 Chief
Justice Roberts complained that "the redress the petitioners seek is focused
no more on them than on the public generally."" 7 But the Chief Justice
derived these points of law from cases such as Defenders of Wildlife,

108. Id. at 1456 (majority opinion).
109. Id. at 1466 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the majority "applies our Article III
standing test to the asserted injury of the State's loss of coastal property.. .in its capacity as a
landowner") (citations and internal quotations omitted).
110. Id. at 1466 (citing Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
601 (1982)).
111. Id. at 1454 (majority opinion).
112. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id. at 1456 n.21.
114. Id. at 1454 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
115. Id. at 1467 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 555, 560
n.1).
116. Id. (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573-74).
117. Id.
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analyzing the standing of individual plaintiffs, or of organizational
plaintiffs bringing suit on behalf of their members," 8 and these cases are not
applicable." 9 Where the state, acting as parens patriae, alleges injury to its
quasi-sovereign interests, its interests are essentially identical to those of the
public at large. Yet there is no reason why such an injury to a state's quasisovereign interest cannot be sufficiently "concrete and particularized" to
support Article III standing, as the Court apparently found here.
The Court's holding that a state seeking to protect its quasisovereign interests is entitled to "special solicitude" in determining the
state's standing to sue is important precedent. Besides Massachusettsv. EPA,
states have filed several other lawsuits aimed at reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. 2 ' The Court's holding will undoubtedly make it easier for states
to establish standing in these and future actions to address global warming.
Further, this "new theory of Article III standing for States""' will likely
have broader application, making it easier for states to establish standing
in other actions to protect the health and environment of their citizens.
Significantly, in a large number of the reported cases in which states have
acted as parens patriae to protect quasi-sovereign interests, the state's
claims involved environmental pollution or threats to natural resources. 122
B. EPA's Broad Authority Confirmed
On the question of the EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse
gases, the Court had no difficulty finding that the greenhouse gases fall
neatly within the Clean Air Act's "capacious definition of 'air pollutant. ' 1r"
That decision is intuitive and unremarkable. It is also consistent with lower
court decisions that have tended to interpret environmental statutes

118. The Court has held that an organization has standing to sue on behalf of its members
when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right. Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).
119. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573-78, and cases discussed therein.
120. E.g., New York v. EPA, No. 06-1148 (D.C. Cir. filed Apr. 27, 2006) (state brought action
to compel EPA to place limits on carbon dioxide emissions from new electric power plants);
California ex rel. Lockyer v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 06-CV-05755 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 20,2006)
(state brought action seeking damages from automobile manufacturers for injuries resulting
from greenhouse gas emissions).
121. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1466 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
122. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (flooding); New York v. New
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) (water pollution); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907)
(air pollution); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (diversion of water); Missouri v. Illinois,
180 U.S. 208 (1901) (water pollution).
123. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1462.
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liberally to effectuate their goals.'24 But the Court's decision sets useful
precedent for future cases addressing greenhouse gases under the Clean Air
Act.
What is remarkable is Justice Scalia's dissent. Justice Scalia, joined
by three other Justices, concluded that the term "air pollutant" encompasses
only substances in the air at or near ground level, not greenhouse gases that
occur in the upper atmosphere." In Justice Scalia's view, problems
resulting from atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide "bear little
' 26
He
resemblance to what would naturally be termed 'air pollution. ""
reached this conclusion by patching together loosely related passages from
the EPA's notice denying the petition, constructing an "EPA interpretation"
that EPA itself had not made and then arguing that this "interpretation"
should be afforded deference under Chevron. 27 His reasoning is badly
flawed.
Justice Scalia began with the EPA's conclusion that the definition
of "air pollutant" does not cover greenhouse gases, a conclusion with which
he agreed." In support of this conclusion, he relied almost entirely on the
EPA's discussion of the NAAQS regulatory program in its notice denying
the petition.'2 9 In that discussion, the EPA had explained why, in its view,
it would be inappropriate to regulate greenhouse gases under the NAAQS
program."' The EPA had pointed out, correctly, that the NAAQS primarily
address concentrations of pollutants that occur at ground level."3 But the
EPA also correctly noted that long-range transport of pollutants "may also
contribute to local concentrations in some cases." 1 32 Nowhere did the EPA
state that it interprets the term "air pollutant" (or "air pollution") to apply
only to ground-level pollution. 3' To the contrary, the EPA expressly

124. E.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 570 (10th Cir. 1996) (The
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act "should be
construed liberally to carry out its purpose."); United States v. Boldt, 929 F.2d 35, 41 (1st Cir.
1989) ("federal water pollution laws.. .are construed in a broad, rather than a narrow fashion");
United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1383 (8th Cir. 1989) (The Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act "should be liberally construed.").
125. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1477 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 1476.
129. Id. at 1476-77.
130. Id. at 1477 (quoting Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines,
68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,926-27 (Sept. 8, 2003)).
131. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,926.
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
132. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,927.
133. Nor did EPA advance such an interpretation in the brief it filed with the Court. See
Brief for the Federal Respondent at 20-35, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No.
05-1120).
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"reserve[d] judgment on whether [greenhouse gases] would meet the
[Clean Air Act] definition of 'air pollutant' for regulatory purposes were
they subject to regulation under the [Clean Air Act] for global climate
change purposes."" Nor did the EPA anywhere state that its discussion of
the NAAQS program formed a part of the basis for its conclusion that
greenhouse gases do not fall within the definition of "air pollutant." The
basis for that conclusion was the "indicia of congressional intent" that the
EPA recited in its notice. 3 Furthermore, the EPA's discussion of the
NAAQS regulations was largely beside the point; it had almost nothing to
do with the petition before the EPA, and the EPA had used it only by way
of example or "context." 136 Justice Scalia nevertheless adopted portions of
this discussion as "EPA's interpretation" of the words "air pollution" in the
definition of "air pollutant."137 He faulted the Court for not deferring to the
"EPA's reasonable interpretation" under Chevron."
Putting aside the fact that the interpretation articulated by the EPA
was quite different from Justice Scalia's view of the "EPA interpretation,"
his Chevron argument is wrong for at least two reasons. First, under
Chevron's two-step analysis, the courts look to the agency interpretation of
a statute only if that statute is ambiguous on its face; otherwise the courts
apply the statute's plain meaning.139 Despite Justice Scalia's effort to find
ambiguity in the Act's definition of "air pollutant," it is not there. The
definition of "air pollutant" is very broad. There is nothing on the face of
the statute to suggest that either the term "air pollutant" or the words "air
pollution agent" should be limited to harmful substances in the air only at
ground level and should exclude such substances higher in the atmosphere.
Second, the Court has repeatedly held that an agency interpretation of an
ambiguous statute is entitled to heightened deference only if that

134. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,928-29.
135. Id. at 52,926-28; see discussion supra text accompanying note 19.
136. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,926.
dissenting).
137. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1477 (Scalia, J.,
138. Id. at 1476-77.
139. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, reh'g denied, 468 U.S.
1227 (1984). Under Chevron, judicial review of administrative actions that involve an agency's
statutory interpretation requires a two-step analysis. First, the court must determine "whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Id. at 842. If it has, "that is the
end of the matter," for the court "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress." Id. at 842-43. If, on the other hand, "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843. Further, "considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer...." Id. at 844.
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interpretation has been consistent over time.14 ° Here, the EPA's
interpretation has been markedly inconsistent over time. As we have seen,
in 2003 General Counsel Fabricant repudiated the interpretation advanced
by General Counsel Cannon in 1998 and General Counsel Guzy in 1999 "as
no longer representing the views of EPA's General Counsel" and adopted
the contrary view. 4'
Furthermore, Justice Scalia fails to account for the fact that the
Clean Air Act regulates other substances that occur high in the atmosphere.
For example, it regulates sulfur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen, which form
aerosols in the upper atmosphere and cause acid precipitation. 4 2 It also
regulates chlorofluorocarbons, which destroy the ozone layer in the upper
atmosphere. 4' Certainly, these substances "would naturally be termed 'air
pollution.' ""' Justice Scalia's conclusion that the term "air pollutant"
applies only to ground-level pollutants is nothing short of absurd.
C. EPA's Discretion Curtailed
On the question of the EPA's discretion to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions, the Court had more difficulty in concluding that the EPA did not
adequately justify its denial of the petition. According to the Court, the
EPA's stated reasons for not regulating greenhouse gas emissions did not
relate to the statutory standard -whether those emissions cause or
contribute to global warming. 4 ' In dissent, Justice Scalia leveled two
criticisms at the Court's analysis. First, he said that the EPA did not decide
whether or not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions; it merely decided not
to make such a decision at this time.'4 6 According to Justice Scalia, there are
no statutory standards for deferring a decision. The Court effectively
responded to this criticism by holding that the "EPA can avoid taking
further action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute
to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why
it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do."' 47
The Court found that such a reasonable explanation was lacking in the

140. E.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1309 v. Dep't of Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 108
(1999) ("An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency's
earlier interpretation is entitled to considerably less deference than a consistently held agency
view.").
141. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 13, 14, 23-25.
142. Clean Air Act §§ 401-416; 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (2000).
143. Clean Air Act §§ 601-618; 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671q (2000).
144. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1477 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 1462 (majority opinion).
146. Id. at 1472 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
147. Id. at 1462 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
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EPA's denial. Second, Justice Scalia said that, contrary to the Court's
1
conclusion, the EPA had provided a justification for not setting standards, 4
and that justification was based on the statute. The justification, according
to Justice Scalia, was that scientific uncertainty precludes the EPA from
determining whether or not greenhouse gas emissions cause or contribute
to global warming, and he quoted at length from the EPA's discussion of
those uncertainties in its denial of the petition. 149 He concluded, with some
sarcasm, "I simply cannot conceive of what else the Court would like EPA
to say." " Justice Scalia makes a valid point here, but the Court is
technically correct. The EPA nowhere expressly stated that this scientific
uncertainty was the reason it did not make a determination, or the basis for
its exercise of discretion. The EPA, in effect, did not connect the dots.
It is curious that the EPA was not more methodical and thorough
in arguing that it had the discretion not to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions when it denied the petition. The agency devoted four pages in the
Federal Register to arguing that it did not have the authority to regulate
greenhouse gases"' - a strained argument at best; but it then spent less than
one-half page arguing that it had the discretion not to regulate' 2-a much
more plausible argument. The denial of the petition was poorly written, and
its reasoning difficult to follow." 3 Perhaps it was the product of internal
dissention within the agency over how to justify its decision not to
regulate -a decision that was likely based on politics as much as policy.
The Court nevertheless suggested that the EPA would have another
chance to justify its decision not to regulate: "We need not and do not reach
the question whether on remand EPA must make an endangerment finding,
or whether policy concerns can inform EPA's actions in the event that it
makes such a finding ....
We hold only that EPA must ground its reasons for
action or inaction in the statute."154

148. Id. at 1474 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1474-75 (quoting 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,930 (Sept. 8, 2003)).
150. Id. at 1475.
151. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,925-29.
152. Id. at 52,929.
153. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Tatel, J., dissenting)
("Indeed, reading the relevant sections of EPA's petition denial-one titled 'No Mandatory
Duty,' another 'Different Policy Approach,' and a third 'Administration Global Climate
Change Policy,'- Ifind it difficult even to grasp the basis for EPA's action.") (citation omitted).
154. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1463.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA is highly
significant, both with respect to the case before the Court and with respect
to pending and future litigation over issues related to global warming. Of
course, it remains to be seen whether the EPA will take significant steps to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions in response to the Court's decision. It
also remains to be seen how the lower courts will interpret and apply the
decision. But it is clear that the decision will provide support to those who
are advocating regulatory action to address global warming. As
Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley said, perhaps a little too
optimistically, the "EPA can no longer hide behind the fiction that it 1lacks
55
any regulatory authority to address the problem of global warming."
The Court's decision keeps alive the proceeding on the rulemaking
petition, which was remanded back to the EPA for further action. Although
the Court ruled for the petitioners, it also left the door open for the EPA to
revise its justification for not taking action. On remand, the EPA could
restate its reasons for not taking action on standards for greenhouse gas
emissions, or articulate new reasons for not taking action, and link those
reasons back to the requirements of section 202(a)(1) of the statute. But as
a legal matter, this approach would be difficult and risky. The EPA would
need to convince first its own lawyers and then the reviewing court that its
justification comports with the Court's ruling in Massachusettsv. EPA. This
approach would also be difficult politically. Public opinion has shifted
markedly over the past year on the issue of global warming. Opinion polls
show that a majority of Americans now recognize global warming as a
threat that government needs to address.116 "[R]ight timing," the Greek poet
Hesiod said, "is in all things the most important factor." 15 7 The EPA may
have run out of time.
The Court's decision also set important precedent for pending and
future cases on greenhouse gas emissions. The decision established
precedent on each of the three issues the Court addressed. First, the Court
made new law in ruling that Massachusetts, when protecting its quasisovereign interests, is "entitled to special solicitude" in standing analysis.
This holding will undoubtedly make it easier for states to establish standing
in future actions to address global warming, or otherwise to protect the
health and environment of their citizens. Second, the Court's finding that

155. Beth Daley, High Court Tells EPA to Rethink Policy on Emissions, BOSTON GLoBE, Apr.
3, 2007, at Al.
156. See John M. Broder & Marjorie Connolly, PublicSays Warming Isa Problem, but Remains
Split on Response, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2007, at A20.
157. JOHNBARTLErr, BARTLETrsFAMILARQUOTATIONS 56 (Justin Kaplan ed., 17th ed. 2002)
(quoting HESIOD, WORKS AND DAYS, line 694).
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greenhouse gases fall within the Clean Air Act's definition of "air
pollutant," though in itself unremarkable, also sets useful precedent for
future cases addressing greenhouse gases under the Act. The ruling leaves
no doubt that the regulatory authority of the Clean Air Act can be applied
to greenhouse gas emissions from mobile and stationary sources in the
United States. Third, the Court's decision that the EPA had not stated
adequate reasons for denying the petition will make it more difficult for the
EPA to avoid addressing the global warming issue in the future.
Quoting the petition for certiorari, Justice Stevens referred to global
warming as "the most pressing environmental challenge of our time."" 8 A
century from now, assuming we as a society successfully meet that
challenge, scholars may look back on Massachusetts v. EPA as Justice
Stevens' most important opinion.

158.

Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1446.

